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SHOULD YOU TAKE A LUMP-SUM OR ANNUITIZE? 





We use a unique dataset on individual retirement decisions in Swiss pension funds to analyze 
the choice between an annuity and a lump sum at retirement. Our analysis suggests the 
existence of an “acquiescence bias”, meaning that a majority of retirees chooses the standard 
option offered by the pensions fund or suggested by common practice. Small levels of 
accumulated pension capital are much more likely to be withdrawn as a lump sum, suggesting 
a potential moral hazard behavior or a magnitude effect. We hardly find evidence for adverse 
selection effects in the data. Single men, for example, whose money’s worth of an annuity is 
considerably below the corresponding value of married men, are not more likely to choose the 
capital option. 
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Retiring was easy when most workers were covered by traditional pen-
sions: You cleaned oﬀ your desk, bade farewell to colleagues and
waited for your monthly check to roll in. But as more companies
have shifted to 401(k) plans and portable pensions called cash-balance
plans, retiring workers face some diﬃcult choices. Should they empty
the pot, roll the contents into an individual retirement account, and
try to manage their way to a reasonable rate of return? Or should
they convert the money into an annuity — either through their em-
ployer or an outside insurer — that guarantees a monthly payment
for as long as they live?
Sandra Block, “Should you take a lump sum?”; USA TODAY, July–
19–2002.
The growing importance of fully funded pension plans demands a careful de-
sign of the decumulation phase and the beneﬁts oﬀered to the retirees. Individual
accounts and the presence of a physical capital stock may tempt beneﬁciaries to
withdraw the entire stock as a lump sum, also in cases in which the ﬁrst pillar
does not provide a suﬃcient regular retirement income. Such a behavior may
even be optimal if the social security system of a country guarantees a minimum
income in old age, for example by means tested beneﬁts. Implicit moral hazard
incentives in the second pillar may thus have important spillovers to the ﬁrst
pillar. It comes as no surprise that Chile, which heavily relies on a funded com-
ponent in its old-age provision, has limited the withdrawal of capital in such a
way, that the remaining annuity is high enough to cover the needs of the main
beneﬁciary and his/her spouse.
The possibility to cash out the accumulated old-age assets may not only lead
to moral hazard, but also to adverse selection eﬀects if individuals with a short
life expectancy choose the capital option. This impact can be expected to be
particularly strong in schemes that redistribute explicitly within a generation. In
our example, Switzerland, the survivor component is free, leading to diﬀerences
in the money’s worth ratios of annuities of more than 25% between single and
married men. Based on this feature alone, we would expect single men to choose
the lump sum much more often than married men.
If an individual withdraws the accumulated pension capital as a lump sum,
(s)he foregoes longevity insurance, to the extent that this is not already provided
by the ﬁrst pillar. The lump sum option oﬀers maximum ﬂexibility, but may leave
the individual destitute if the assets are dissipated too quickly. The annuity is
2the only contract that guarantees income right up to the point of death, but may
unduly constrain the individual at certain times. Thus the value of a life-long
income does not simply depend on the money’s worth of the annuity, but also on
the insurance implied by it. As Brown (2003) has pointed out, the utility gains
from such an insurance may be large.
The choice between a lump sum and an annuity at retirement is not an easy
one. It involves knowledge about one’s own (and possibly the spouse’s) life ex-
pectancy and also about the investment returns one anticipates to earn. More-
over, one needs to know whether social security and other sources of income will
be suﬃcient to provide adequate retirement income if one lives too long. Other
aspects may be equally important. Spells of bad health or other unexpected large
expenditures may require enough cash at hand. Last but not least, retired peo-
ple may want to leave a bequest to their children. If they die “too early”, fully
annuitized wealth may prevent them from doing so.
Despite the importance of the issue, little is known of when and why indi-
viduals (do not) cash out the accumulated pension capital at retirement. This
is not surprising given the relatively young age of funded schemes in most coun-
tries. One of the few exceptions is the work by Hurd, Lillard and Panis (1998),
who analyze pension cash-outs using HRS data. They ﬁnd that 54 percent of
job leavers took the lump sum, with cash-out rates lower for large distributions
and among workers who are older, well-educated, male, non-black, or earn high
incomes. Cash-out rates are higher for separated or divorced individuals, and
among individuals with lower incomes, who are particularly vulnerable to old age
poverty. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, they ﬁnd higher rates among
individuals with a relatively short ﬁnancial planning horizon or who themselves
state that their chances of surviving another twenty years or so are well below
average.
Our analysis is related to a body of literature dealing with withdrawals from
pension plans by plan participants, either upon job change or upon retirement
age. The growing availability of data sources over the past decades, and the
potential importance of lump sum distributions due to the passage of ERISA1
in the US, drew increased attention to empirical research on cash-out behavior,
in particular on the incidence and utilization of lump sum distributions from
pension plans and targeted retirement saving accounts. A number of studies
(Atkins, 1986; Piacentini, 1990; Fernandez, 1992; Poterba, Venti and Wise, 1995;
Yakoboski, 1997; Hurd, Lillard and Panis, 1998) based on information provided
by the Current Population Survey (CPS) supplements on Employee Beneﬁts,
1Employment Retirement and Income Security Act (1974), aimed at promoting private
retirement savings.
3the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Hewitt Associates data deliver
a very consistent result: the majority of workers cash out lump sum pension
settlements upon leaving their job.2
In Switzerland, a majority of the retired individuals in occupational pension
plans choose the annuity, even if they are given the option to cash-out, and
despite the fact that the ﬁrst pillar already provides a basis annuity stream in old
age. This surprising outcome, given the evidence mentioned above, is analyzed
in this paper. Occupational pension schemes, constituting the second pillar of
Swiss old age insurance, are privately managed (usually by the ﬁrm), but are
mandatory for all workers earning a yearly income above a certain threshold. As
a consequence of the system being mandatory, and accounting for roughly 50% of
retirement income, the accumulated capital stocks are very large, amounting to
approximately 450’000 SFR (= 350’000 USD) on average. Section 2.1 describes
the Swiss pension system in more detail, and also presents a tractable framework
to model the choice between an annuity and a lump sum (i.e., the decision what
fraction of capital to annuitize).
For our empirical analysis, we use a unique sample of individuals (as described
in section 3) facing a choice between a lump sum payment and an annuity upon
retirement in 10 Swiss pension funds. As individuals do not have a choice between
diﬀerent pension providers in Switzerland (apart from the fact that they may
choose the employer), the data exhibits hardly any selection bias. It also provides
us with detailed information about each individual’s pension plan.
We show in section 4 that a majority of the individuals in our sample chooses
the annuity option, but also that there are large diﬀerences between compa-
nies. The data clearly exhibits an “acquiescence bias”: the respondents generally
choose the standard option oﬀered by the company or follow their peers. We
also demonstrate that small stocks of old age capital are much more likely to be
withdrawn as a lump sum. This may be due to a magnitude eﬀect — the small
2The choice between an annuity and a lump sum has also been used to estimate personal
discount rates. A particularly compelling ﬁeld study in terms of magnitudes of stakes and the
credibility of pay–outs has recently been presented by Warner and Pleeter (2001). As part of
a US military down–sizing program volunteers were given the choice between an annuity over
a number of years (related to previous years in service) and a one–time lump–sum payment,
both depending on the leaver’s previous salary and years of service. A large majority of the
volunteers chose the lump–sum although the implicit discount rate — the rate at which the
present value of the annuity and the lump–sum were equal — amounted to 17% (in nominal
terms). The author estimate the underlying discount rates and found values of 0–30., but
Shane, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2002) argue that in a perfect capital market, the choice
between an annuity and a lump sum cannot be used to assess the personal discount rate. One
would rather estimate the underlying market interest rate in such an exercise.
4annuity is not worth the annuitization. It may also hint at a moral hazard behav-
ior as an annuity reduces the potential social assistance more than the capital.
Men and women seem to behave diﬀerently, but marital status does not seem to
be important. We also show that the implicit price of the annuity has a strong
and signiﬁcant impact on the decision to annuitize for men, but not for women.
2 Background
2.1 The Swiss occupational pension system
To understand the choice between a lump sum and an annuity within in our data
set, some basic background information about the Swiss scheme is indispensable.3
Switzerland’s pension system is composed of three pillars, of which the ﬁrst and
second are of approximately equal importance. The ﬁrst pillar is a predominantly
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, and aims at providing a basic subsistence level
of income to all retired residents in Switzerland. The second pillar is a manda-
tory, employer-based, fully funded occupational pension scheme. The statutory
retirement age is 65 for men and currently 64 for women. Until 2003 (i.e., for the
women in our sample), the applicable female retirement had been 62.4
The main goal of the occupational pension system is to maintain the pre-
retirement living standard, together with the beneﬁts stemming from the ﬁrst
pillar. As the latter provides a basic level of income, the second pillar only
insures income above a certain threshold level, which is equal to the amount of
a yearly maximum single ﬁrst pillar pension5. While there is in principle also a
maximum insured income, most companies do not implement it. All companies
in our sample cover the whole income above the lower threshold level.
Contributions, of which the employer has to pay at least half, are strictly
proportional to the insured income.6 These old-age credits are accumulated as
3A detailed description of all aspects of the Swiss social security system is beyond the scope
of this paper. The interested reader is referred to Queissar & Vittas (2000, especially concerning
institutional details) and B¨ utler (2004, for the second pillar).
4Note that retirement at 65/64 is not mandatory by law, but reaching age 65 for men or age
64 for women is rather an eligibility condition for claiming public pension beneﬁts. Most labor
contracts specify a retirement age that coincides with the eligibility age.
5In 2004, this threshold was: 25’320 CHF ≈ 17’000 EURO ≈ 18’500 USD. This threshold
explains the much lower coverage for female workers, who often work part-time and have lower
average wages than men.
6The law speciﬁes minimum contribution rates that increase with age (from 7% at age 25
to 18% from age 55 onwards), but the pension fund can deviate from this pattern as long as
the same contribution rate is attained on average.
5retirement assets and bear interest. The minimum interest rate is determined by
the Swiss Federal Council. The accrued capital is fully portable when the insured
individual changes the employer. By law, an employee changing the ﬁrm gets the
total accumulated contributions (including the employer’s part), but the full sum
has to be paid into the new fund, with very few exceptions (self–employment
under certain conditions, or those who leave the country for good). The total
amount of money at retirement has thus been accumulated over the entire work
life and is, therefore, a good proxy for lifetime income.
Upon attainment of the retirement age, the accumulated capital can be with-
drawn either as a monthly life-long annuity — this is the standard option — or as
a lump sum (or a mix of the two), provided that the pension fund allows for the
full/partial lump sum option. Occupational pension annuities are strictly pro-
portional to the accumulated retirement assets (retirement credits plus accrued
interest). The accumulated capital K is translated into a yearly pension B using
the conversion factor γ, which is independent of gender and marital status, but
may depend on the retirement age:
B = γK.
This conversion also applies to deﬁned beneﬁt plans; the fund has to make sure
that enough capital is accumulated to cover the claims made based on previous
income. The second pillar mandates joint annuities. When a retired individual
dies, his/her surviving spouse receives a beneﬁt amounting to 60% of the previous
pension, the dependent children a beneﬁt of up to 20% each. As a consequence of
survivor beneﬁts and diﬀerential mortality, the money value of an annuity diﬀers
considerably across gender, and even more strikingly, across marital status as
Table 1 illustrates.7
Most pension funds aim at a replacement rate of approximately 50% to 60%
of the insured income. Together with the income from the ﬁrst pillar, the net re-
placement rate after taxes amounts to 70-80% even for high income groups. This
is also a consequence of the fact that there are no social security deductions on
pension beneﬁts, and that federal and cantonal taxes in Switzerland are progres-
sive. Taking into account the availability of additional children pension beneﬁts,
the eﬀective net replacement rate can be well above 100% for an individual with
an uninterrupted working career. Of course, individuals with an interrupted or
7The numbers in Table 1 were compiled using the legal conversion factor and the retirement
ages that had been valid until 2004, thus the period covering our dataset. The increase in the
female retirement age to 64 and a decrease in the conversion factor have equalized on average
the money’s worth of annuities for men and women.
6shorter working career (due to immigration, unemployment, family time or other
reasons), may well have a lower replacement rate.
In case the combined pension income is not suﬃcient to cover the basic needs
in old age, means-tested supplemental beneﬁts can be claimed. These additional
beneﬁts usually lead to an income that is well above the poverty threshold. In-
dividuals receiving the maximum beneﬁts out of the ﬁrst pillar, for example,
already qualify for supplemental beneﬁts. This means that the depletion of the
second pillar capital stock can be the optimal response for individuals with a
relatively low second pillar income.
gender marital R.A. (spouse) MWR
female married 62 (65.7) 1.210
female married 62 (—) 1.171
female single 62 1.143
female divorced 62 1.108
female widowed 62 1.139
male married 65 (61.3) 1.093
male married 65 (55) 1.148
male married 65 (—) 0.896
male single 65 0.805
male divorced 65 0.796
male widowed 65 0.809
Table 1: Money’s Worth Ratios as a function of marital status for individuals
retiring in 2004. The computations are based on a constant nominal interest rate
of 3.5%, a conversion factor of 7.2%, and a retirement age of 62/65 for men
and women, respectively. The main claimant’s spouse (age in parenthesis) gets a
survivor beneﬁt of 60% (λ = 0.6).
2.2 The choice between annuity and lump sum capital at
retirement: Theory and empirical predictions
When facing the choice between an annuity and a (partial) lump sum, an indi-
vidual should choose the option that delivers the highest expected utility. The
optimal level of annuitization presumably depends on personal characteristics (in
particular mortality rates), preference parameters (such as the discount factor,
the risk aversion, and bequest motives), as well as other sources of income (sav-
ings, social security), the details of the pension plan and asset market conditions.
7Unfortunately, for an outside observer, it is not as straightforward to assess the
expected utility, as a number of assumptions (apart from the equally unknown
parameters of the utility function) are needed to do the comparison. Firstly,
one should ideally know other sources of income than the occupational pension,
notably other retirement income and private savings. Fortunately, ﬁrst pillar re-
tirement income does not vary widely across individuals covered by the second
pillar. Other sources of retirement income, however, are generally unknown. Sec-
ondly, one needs to know what the lump–sum — if chosen — is used for. The
implications are very diﬀerent between a lump sum that is used to guarantee a
certain level of bequest and a lump sum invested in another annuity product.8
Thirdly, by age 60, individuals have a fairly good grasp of their life expectancy.
For an outside observer, however, the expected life span remains hidden as far as
it is not related to gender, marital status and wealth.
This section presents a stylized model of the choice between an annuity and
a lump sum to derive some testable conclusions for our empirical analysis with a
focus on the role of the capital stock. However, the actual future value of various
payment options also depends to some extent on other factors. Therefore, we
also discuss features that cannot be directly captured by our simple model, such
as behavioral aspects and the Swiss social security and tax system.
2.2.1 A 2-period model with bequests
To study the choice between an annuity and a lump sum (or a linear combination
of the two), we consider an individual upon retirement. (S)he has a remaining
life-time of two periods, with no mortality within the ﬁrst period, and a survival
rate Ψ to the second. Death is certain at the end of period two. At the onset of
the ﬁrst period individual is assumed to have an accumulated capital stock K, of
which the individual chooses a fraction (1 − x) to be withdrawn as a lump sum,
while the rest is converted into an annuity, at a conversion rate γ. Per period,
the individual’s annuity income will thus be B = γxK. The gross interest rate
is R.
An actuarially fair conversion rate γfair would equalize the present value of








8In Switzerland, the market for private annuities outside the second pillar is very small.
Given the high money’s worth ratios of the system, it is not surprising, that almost nobody
withdraws the second pillar capital to buy another annuity in the private sector.
8To simplify the exposition below, we will use α ≡
γ
1−γ as a measure of return for
the annuity. An actuarial fair α would, therefore, be αfair = R
Ψ.
We assume that there is a bequest motive in both periods with period utility
v(bi), where bi denotes the level of bequest in period i. Instantaneous consumption
utility is denoted by u(ci). The expected remaining utility is given by
U = u(c1) + βΨu(c2) + (1 − Ψ)v(b1) + βΨv(b2),
subject to the budget constraints
b1 = K [(1 − x) + xγ] − c1 (1)
b2 = K [R{(1 − x) + xγ} + xγ] − Rc1 − c2
= Rb1 + xγK − c2 (2)
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to c1, c2, b1, b2 and x lead to the following
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In the absence of a bequest motive, it is optimal to fully annuitize if the implicit
return of the annuity α is greater than R.
But it can also be shown that it is optimal to annuitize at least a fraction of
the accumulated capital in the presence of a bequest motive as long as the annuity
rate is not too far away from its fair value. This can be seen by the marginal rate of
substitution between the levels of bequest at the two possible dates (equation (5)),





Ψ + R | {z }
γfair
K − c2) (7)
The annuitization is closely related to second period consumption. This can
be nicely illustrated in a situation in which R = β = 1. The optimally chosen
annuity xγfairK is exactly equal to c2. The same result is also derived in Davidoﬀ,
Brown and Diamond (2005) in a somewhat diﬀerent model setup. If the annuity
is actuarially fair and βR = 1, but R > 1, it is easily shown that the level of
annuitization is smaller than second period consumption, provided the marginal
utility of bequest is decreasing, v′′(·) < 0.
In our stylized model, the insurance against longevity, together with the pro-
vision of income for dependent survivors, drive the decision of how much to
annuitize. Obviously, a lump sum provides far less insurance than the annu-
ity. Brown (2003) ﬁnds that in the absence of other retirement income, utility
equivalent wealth for a life–long annuity is approximately 50% higher than in a
setting without annuity markets. As long as α is greater than R, this result caries
through to people with a shorter than average life–expectancy, i.e., individuals
that do not necessarily beneﬁt from an annuity in money’s worth terms.
2.2.2 Individual characteristics and the decision to annuitize
Like in Brown (2003), and Davidoﬀ, Brown & Diamond (2005), a bequest motive
lessens the demand for annuities to a certain degree. If one wants to insure a
certain level of bequest, a partial capital withdrawal is usually beneﬁcial. The
stronger the bequest motive, the lower is the desire to annuitize.9 If, for exam-
ple, the marginal utility from bequest v′(·) is decreasing less fast than marginal
consumption felicity u′(·) (i.e., v′′(·) > u′′(·)), richer individuals will withdraw a
higher fraction as a lump sum. As an extreme example, consider the case of a
linear function v; then all the individuals will annuitize the same level (but of
course not the same fraction) of capital.10
An increase in the conversion factor leads to a higher optimal annuitization.
(Recall that a higher conversion factor is equivalent to a lower price for the
annuity, K = B/γ.) This can be seen as follows: A higher γ (or, equivalently, α)
increases the available resources for the individual. Second period consumption
9It is clear from equation (7) that a lower optimal c2 reduces the desired fraction of capital
annuitized.
10Excluding corner solutions, in which the capital stock is too low to equalize the marginal
utilities of consumption and bequest.
10increases with respect to ﬁrst period consumption (equation (3)), while c1 in turn
increases with respect to ﬁrst period bequest (equation (4)). These predictions
from the FOC are only compatible with an increase in x.
Using a similar line of reasoning, the model also predicts that individuals with
a higher life expectancy (i.e., a higher Ψ) choose to annuitize a larger fraction of
their accumulated pension wealth. Consumption in both periods — and, as a
consequence b2 — are increased relative to ﬁrst period bequest. Again, this is
only compatible with a higher x.11 For the outside researcher, diﬀerences in
survival rates may only be observed indirectly as a function of gender, family
status, and — to a limited degree — accumulated pension wealth. Because
(single and married) women live longer than single men on average, the former
should choose a higher fraction of annuity, and the latter higher lump–sum capital
payment. As expected lifetime is correlated with wealth (diﬀerential mortality),
richer pensioners should opt for a higher annuity, and poorer for a higher fraction
in the one–time capital payment.
In case the individual can achieve a larger return on his investment R (leaving
γ constant), the degree of annuitization would fall. While such a change leaves
the MRS between c1 and c2, and c2 and b2 unaﬀected, the optimal level of bequest
in the ﬁrst period increases relative to ﬁrst period consumption and second period
bequest. The individual will thus choose a lower x. Richer agents are potentially
more capable of managing a large fund, i.e., to achieve a higher R. This may
oﬀset the advantage of an annuity (caused by a lower mortality rate) for them to
a certain degree.
Of course our model does not capture all aspects of the annuity-capital trade-
oﬀ. In particular, it does not take into account that a survivor insurance increases
the attractiveness of the annuity option, although this may be approximated by
a higher survival probability Ψ. Married men should prefer a higher share of
annuitization than single men due to the high value of the survivor insurance.
Moreover, the presence of children under 18 (for which a substantial supplemental
beneﬁt is due in case of the main beneﬁciary choosing the annuity), also increases
the value of the annuity substantially.
2.2.3 Capital market conditions and taxation of retirement income
Even if the present value of the lump sum and the annuity were the same, capital
market imperfections and diﬀerences in mortality rates would lead to a potential
11The prediction concerning mortality diﬀerences crucially hinges on the ability of individuals
to assess their survival probabilities. Hamermesh (1985) has found that people are well informed
about their life expectancy by the age they retire.
11(ir)reversibility of choice: In this case, ceteris paribus, rational agents should
choose the more ﬂexible option. Although it is relatively cheap to transform the
lump–sum into a stream of payments for a limited time, it is a lot more diﬃcult
to get the original annuity option back as the private annuity market is plagued
by adverse selection eﬀects. On the other hand an annuity can only be translated
into a lump sum if the loan can be backed up by assets (such as housing). Which
of the two constraints is the more relevant is an open question.
The tax treatment for the two options diﬀers widely across cantons (the Swiss
states). In most cantons a lump sum capital payment is converted into an annuity
stream, using the conversion factor provided by the pension fund. The marginal
tax rate computed from the corresponding annuity stream is then applied to the
entire capital stock in the case of a lump sum payment. The tax structure favors
the capital option as additional income from other sources, which increases the
eﬀective marginal tax rate under the annuity option, is not taken into account for
the lump sum. For married women at retirement, moreover, the tax treatment of
the capital option is much more attractive as an annuity is taxed at the marginal
tax rate the married couple faces. Although there are some alternative methods
to impute taxes on the lump sum, the total tax bill is smaller for the lump sum
in all cantons.
Annuities hedge individuals from the risk of inﬂation to a certain degree. Al-
though the adjustment of beneﬁts to inﬂation is not cast in stone in Switzerland,
the pension fund is required to adjust the beneﬁts to inﬂation if the ﬁnancial
situation allows it. In the past this has been done by most pension providers.
2.2.4 The role of accumulated capital at retirement
One of the key parameters in our analysis is the accumulated stock of retirement
capital K. We therefore review how the stock of capital may inﬂuence an agent’s
choice between an annuity and a lump sum payment. Before doing so, it is
important to mention a choice anomaly that may plague our analysis.
A large body of literature (Ainslie and Varda Haendel, 1983; Thaler, 1981;
Loewenstein, 1987 among others) has pointed out that small outcomes are dis-
counted at a higher rate than large ones.12 In other words, for small stakes agents
generally prefer an early payment to a deferred one even if the choice implies a
high discount rate. Although primarily viewed as a choice anomaly, some as-
pects of this “magnitude eﬀect” may be explained by the impact of neglected
constraints or neglected aspects in a person’s utility function as outlined below.
12See Shane, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2001).
12The following aspects form the elements of a hypothetical capital function
(also depicted in Figure 1):
(Pure) magnitude eﬀects: For low levels of capital, the annuity just does not
appear to be high enough to be considered as an option. However, it is im-
portant to mention that this is also true for the fund, which usually incurs
ﬁx costs per insured individual. Some pension funds even require individ-
uals to withdraw a small capital stock as a lump sum (these observations
will not be considered in our empirical analysis). It is unknown whether
companies implicitly try to inﬂuence beneﬁciaries to do so.
Income support: Let us consider an individual with a low level of accumulated
capital. An annuity, even small, is detrimental to the eligibility for income
support. In Switzerland (as in other countries), wealth is only taken into
account if it
exceeds a certain threshold level (40’000 Sfr = ≈ 32’000 US$), while regular
income counts from the ﬁrst dollar. It is thus optimal to choose the lump–
sum option for low levels of capital.
Diﬀerential mortality: Accumulated capital is a good indicator of a person’s
lifetime income and social status. Mortality rates are decreasing (i.e., Ψ is
increasing in the model) with lifetime income, especially in the lower income
range. The probability of choosing the lump sum can thus be expected to
decrease in the level of accumulated capital up to a certain level.
Consumption and bequest motives: Our model shows that it may be opti-
mal to hold a certain fraction of the pension wealth in the form of capital
to be able to bequeath it to the children.13 In the likely case the mar-
ginal utility of bequest is decreasing less rapidly than the marginal utility
of consumption, richer agents should choose a lower annuitization rate.
Investment opportunities (and skills): An individual may choose the capi-
tal option if he thinks he can obtain a better return than the one oﬀered
from the annuity scheme. Investment opportunities will most likely de-
pend on the total amount to be invested, but also on investment abilities.
The higher average capital stock at retirement may facilitate alternative
investments especially if investment abilities are correlated with wealth.
13Of course agents can save for a bequest independently from the accumulated capital at
retirement, but there is the risk to die prematurely and thus leave a small amount of money.
The lump sum payment guarantees a certain level of bequest.
13Preferential tax treatment: In Switzerland, there is clearly a tax advantage
to withdraw the accumulated pension wealth in the form of a lump sum.
This eﬀect is much stronger for high and very high levels of capital.
To summarize, magnitude eﬀects, income support, and diﬀerential mortality
should lead to a decreasing probability of choosing the lump sum for low and
moderate levels of pension wealth, whereas investment opportunities and prefer-
ential tax treatment should lead to an increase in the likelihood of choosing the
lump sum at relatively high levels of capital. Taken together, these two groups of
eﬀects can be expected to lead to a U–shaped relationship between the probabil-
ity of choosing the lump sum option and the total stock of capital at retirement.
The impact of the bequest motive is a priori unclear. As is outlined above, the
bequest motive will lead to a positive correlation between pension wealth and
the preference for a lump sum, provided the marginal utility from bequest is











































































Figure 1: Probability of choosing the lump sum as a function of the accumulated
capital stock.
143 The data
We use data collected at the individual level from 10 Swiss companies, both pub-
lic and private, active in several branches of the economy. The dataset includes
the national public railway company, civil servants in two cantons, several in-
dustry ﬁrms, as well as clothing and food ﬁrms. We only use observations with
retirement year 1990 and later, due to lack of suﬃcient information for earlier
years. The novel aspect of our data is that it is not survey data, but comes from
administrative records. This allows us to control for all company speciﬁc pension
scheme details, including individual retirement plans. As people do not have a
choice of pension funds (unless it inﬂuences the choice of the employer), there
is hardly any selection bias. For the companies in our sample, we were given
information about all retired individuals in a given year.
It is important to mention that we had to exclude several contacted companies
for various reasons. In some companies, the capital option was only introduced
recently, and the number of observations too small. Much more important is the
exclusion of several small pension funds that displayed no variability with respect
to the level of annuitization chosen by the insured individuals.14 In all but one of
these cases, all retirees chose to cash-out, despite the annuity being the default
option. Pension fund managers usually explain the phenomenon with peer eﬀects
and an implicit standard option (“it has always been done like that”). Over the
years, the eﬀective standard option may therefore well deviate from the default
option of the fund. For one of the companies in our sample (Kambly, a small
biscuit factory), this eﬀect was also conﬁrmed by the fund representative.
The ﬁnal dataset consists of 2702 individuals. For each of them, we have one
observation which includes the date (or year) of birth, the marital status, the
date (or year) of retirement, the yearly pension payments (base level) and/or the
accumulated capital stock, the number of children under 18/25, the conversion
factor, as well as additional temporary beneﬁts. Note that the individual decisions
we analyze are observed at diﬀerent points in time. On the ﬁrm level, we are
also provided with details of early retirement plans, in particular the availability
of ﬁrst pillar replacement packages.15 By means of such company details we
were able to impute the annuity at the retirement date and in the future for
all individuals. Unfortunately, we do not have direct information about past
14As this information was conveyed over the phone, we were unable to check the validity of
this assertion, except in three cases for which we had data.
15Some of the relevant information for the project had to be imputed from other sources
(regulation of pension fund) or from a combination of available data. In many cases, the
information could only be gathered from a personal interview with the responsible pension
fund manager.
15income streams for most companies. As outlined before in section 2.1, however,
the accumulated pension capital, and thus the derived annuity, is approximately
proportional to the level of pre-retirement income above the threshold level as
speciﬁed in the law.
Most of the variables are self-explanatory. Gender takes the form of a dummy,
whose value is 0 for females and 1 for males. Males and females represent 83 and
17 percent of the sample, respectively. The great majority is represented by
married individuals (81%), followed by divorced and separated (8.1%), singles
(7.2%), and widowed (3.7%). The sample consists of individuals whose age at
retirement ranges from 55 to 68.
The conversion factor (γ) is the factor at which the accumulated capital is
translated into an annuity, B = γK. It usually depends on the individual’s age
at retirement, and company speciﬁc retirement schemes. Note that we can pin
down the conversion factor on the individual level using the information provided
by the pension fund. The variable “margin” is 1 for individuals who choose a
combination between an annuity and a lump sum payment which is not the
standard option oﬀered by the respective pension fund.
Only some variables are available for the complete sample, namely age at re-
tirement, gender, yearly pension, total capital accumulated at retirement, fraction
of total capital paid out as a lump sum, conversion factor, margin, non-standard
option and whether the company operates under deﬁned beneﬁts (= 1) or deﬁned
contributions. As for the other variables, the number of observations is some-
what smaller. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables we use for
empirical analysis.
We also construct a measure for pension wealth at the statutory retirement
age, by using ﬁrm speciﬁc information on conversion factors, early retirement
plans and other beneﬁts.16 The variable annuity value corresponds to the yearly
pension at the regular retirement age if all capital were fully annuitized, including
the annuitized value of any lump sum payment upon retirement. To account for
economic growth and inﬂation, these numbers are deﬂated by the nominal Swiss
GDP (base year 2000). The corresponding normalized capital stock can then be
computed, using the conversion factor at the regular retirement age γ = 0.072.
We use the logarithm and its square for the analysis. We have also experimented
16To compute the increase in the retirement capital between the observed retirement age and
the statutory retirement age, we need a measure of the relevant wage for that period. As we
do not always know the wage prior to the (early) retirement decision, we had to impute it from
the accumulated capital, using information on company speciﬁc contribution rates, the average
wage growth and (if available) other beneﬁts. We have experimented with diﬀerent versions of
imputation, but the results turned out to be very robust.
16with other measures of pension wealth, most importantly with the actual wealth
at the time of decision, but the results did not change at all.
Variable Mean Std. Min Max # obs.






Gender (1 = male) .830 .376 0 1 2702
Children (≤ 18/25 y.) .059 .313 0 4 2024
Total cap. at retirement 462’458 275’676 1’560 3’325’360 2702
Equivalent annuity (⇒ text) 35’400 21’586 115 257’573 2702
Lump-sum capital 68’360 148’183 0 1’089’898 2702
Fraction of total cap. .186 .345 0 1 2702
Conversion factor (gamma) .0678 .0038 .0555 .077 2702
Non–standard option (= 1) .295 .4561 0 1 2702
Margin .152 .359 0 1 2702
Deﬁned beneﬁts .438 .496 0 1 2701
Table 2: Summary statistics for some relevant variables. (** average capital:
married men = 556’505; single men = 472’858; married women = 207’593; single
women = 444’216)
3.1 Individual preferences over options
Table 3 reports a number of relative frequencies of the choice variable, classiﬁed by
full/partial annuity or full lump sum, by several demographic and socio-economic
characteristics and p-values referring to χ2-tests of the null that the distribution
of preference over the three possible options is the same across diﬀerent values
of a characteristic. Diﬀerences in preferences are strongly signiﬁcant along all
characteristics. Along all characteristics the annuity is by far the most preferred
option. This reﬂects preferences over the whole sample, where more than 60
percent of observations choose the annuity. In particular, the annuity payment
is the most preferred option among single individuals (67.46 percent), whereas
females choose the (full) lump sum payment more than males (29.41 percent
versus 22.78 percent). These ﬁndings are not consistent with the predictions of
17the theoretical model described in Section 2.2. Interestingly, as already mentioned
diﬀerences in choices are strongly signiﬁcant along the “company” dimension,
suggesting a relevant role of company ﬁxed eﬀects in the personal choice.
Characteristic Partial Full Small #
or Company Annuity L.S. L.S. cap. obs.
Female 60.35 10.24 29.41 459
Male 60.99 16.23 22.78 2243
p-value .000
Single 67.46 10.06 22.49 169
Married 62.08 14.46 23.46 1867
Sep. & div. 61.29 11.29 27.42 186
Widowed 63.22 10.34 26.44 87
p-value .000
PK-Manor 69.64 13.09 17.27 359
SBB (DB) 86.26 12.68 1.07 req (9) 844
SIG 50.79 24.87 24.34 378
Kambly 25.81 - 74.19 31
Alusuisse (DB) 90.00 10 - 70
Unilever 10.26 89.74 - 39
NCR 93.33 6.67 - 15
ABB 55.05 20.06 24.89 req (2) 683
Thalwil 71.43 - 28.57 sugg (0) 14
Ascom (DB) 82.16 17.84 - sugg (0) 269
p-value .000
Total sample 60.88 15.21 23.91 2702
Table 3: Individual preferences over options by gender, marital status and com-
pany (percentages). The standard option of the pension fund is underlined. req =
small levels of pension capital must be withdraw as a lump sum, sugg = pension
fund suggests small capital holdings to be paid out as a lump sum (in parenthesis:
the number of individuals aﬀected by this). DB = company under deﬁned beneﬁt
scheme.
We then explore preferences by company more deeply. Nine out of ten compa-
nies provide an annuity as the default option, and allow for a partial or full lump
sum payment as an alternative. The remaining company provides a lump sum
payment (amounting to the last working year’s salary) as the standard option.
Table 3 shows that overall the standard option is preferred by more than 2/3 of
18the sample. For six companies this percentage is even bigger, reaching a maxi-
mum of 93.33 percent (NCR); for two companies (SIG and ABB) preferences over
options are basically evenly distributed, with a slight predominance of the default
one; in only one case (Kambly) the alternative option overcomes the default one
(74.19 percent vs. 25.81 percent). These ﬁgures suggest that there may be a sort
of “acquiescence bias” driving people’s choices17. A puzzle in itself is why so few
individuals choose a combination of an annuity and a lump-sum although this
would seem to be the dominant strategy according to theory unless the bequest
motive is absent (full annuitization) or very strong (full lump sum).
4 Empirical results
4.1 Basic speciﬁcation
The determinants of choosing a (partial) lump sum payment are analyzed by
implementing Probit regressions with several speciﬁcations. Basic regressions are
reported in Table 4. The individual choice is studied with respect to some back-
ground personal characteristics (such as gender, marital status and number of
dependent children), together with annuity value (plus a quadratic term for it in
order to capture a potential non–monotonic relation), the age at retirement and
the personal conversion factor. Recall that the latter is a measure of the value
of the annuity relative to the capital option. We also include a dummy variable
for the type of beneﬁt structure (deﬁned beneﬁts or deﬁned contributions). The
retirement year is taken into account as a dummy variable. We have also exper-
imented with macroeconomic conditions in lieu of retirement year dummies, but
the ﬁt never improved. This is not surprising given the fact that our data cover
a relatively short period.
As Table 3 illustrates, there are large diﬀerences between companies even
when the suggested standard option is the same. Company ﬁxed eﬀects are
thus included in all the regressions. They should account for diﬀerences in the
characteristics of the pension scheme that are not documented. Moreover, since
for some individuals the capital option is mandatory, we always exclude such
observations to capture a pure individual choice.
Three diﬀerent speciﬁcations of this basic regression are shown in Table 4.
Regression I only includes gender (as not all companies report marital status),
whereas in regressions II and III marital status and number of children are added,
17The expression “acquiescence bias” (Hurd, 1999) or “status-quo bias” or “friendliness ef-
fect” refers to a systematic bias caused by some respondents tending to agree with whatever is
presented to them.
19respectively. Overall, among individual background characteristics only “having
children” signiﬁcantly aﬀects individual preferences, inducing people to choose
the annuity option (see regression III). Contrary to the theoretical prediction,
singles are less likely to choose the capital option, but neither gender nor marital
status seem to play a signiﬁcant role in the decision to annuitize or not.
The stock of capital at retirement (measured by the equivalent annuity value)
plays an important role in all speciﬁcations. Both terms related to this variable
are jointly signiﬁcant at the 1% level.18 The capital function corresponding to
regression III is depicted in Figure 2. We can see that the amount of the ac-
cumulated capital stock is negatively related with the probability of choosing a
lump sum payment until a value of approximately 250,000 Swiss Francs (around
200,000 US$ or 160,000 Euro); after that value the relation seems to be positive.
Age at retirement is highly signiﬁcant: The higher the retirement age, the higher
the probability of withdrawing the capital as a lump sum. The most probable
reason is that many pension funds oﬀer a (partially or fully refundable) bridging
pension until the statutory retirement age is reached. Although this is not tied
to the annuity option per se, it may induce individuals to stay with the stan-
dard (annuity) option. Moreover, as ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts are only available from
the statutory retirement age onward, a second pillar annuity constitutes the only
regular income stream until the age 65 for men and age 62 for women.
As expected, the probability of choosing a lump sum payment is a decreasing
function of the conversion factor; γ, which corresponds to the value of an annuity,
is strongly signiﬁcant in all regressions. Individuals in deﬁned beneﬁts schemes
are less likely to choose the capital option. In deﬁned beneﬁt plans, the annuity
option is probably better anchored, due to the stronger focus on the annuity
beneﬁt in such schemes. The value of each option is usually more transparent in
deﬁned contribution schemes, making it easier for individuals to deviate from the
default option. If transparency was the responsible factor for the diﬀerence in the
probability to choose the lump sum, we should also observe a higher sensitivity
of the choice to pension plan details (such as the conversion factor) in deﬁned
contribution plans. This will be explored below.
We consider three alternative speciﬁcations in Table 5. The ﬁrst is to capture
marital status as a single variable, as being married, divorced or widowed impacts
the choice in the same direction (albeit in a non-signiﬁcant way), but opposite
to singles. Not surprisingly, there is no big diﬀerence.19 The second change, as
18The corresponding statistic for regression III is chi2(2)=39.07.
19As suggested by Table 1, the MWRs (money’s worth ratios) for single females and married
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Figure 2: Capital function implied by regression III
21Regression I II III
Coeﬀ. p value Coeﬀ. p value Coeﬀ. p value
Expl. variables (Std) (Std) (Std)
Gender (male=1) .168 0.107 .105 0.340 .068 0.563
(104) (.110) (.116)
Married .124 0.329 .125 0.370
(.127) (.139)
Divorced .056 0.729 .083 0.636
(.163) (.176)




Annuity value (log) -2.28 0.000 -2.59 0.000 -2.66 0.000
(.395) (.434) (.456)
Annuity value2 (log) .113 0.000 .131 0.000 .135 0.000
(.021) (.023) (.024)
Age at retirement .132 0.000 .134 0.001 .165 0.000
(.034) (.041) (.043)
Conversion factor γ -90.7 0.000 -88.2 0.001 -117.7 0.000
(22.4) (27.7) (30.1)
Deﬁned beneﬁts (=1) -.567 0.022 -.722 0.018 CL
(.248) (.306)
Company dummies YES YES YES
Retirement year dummies YES YES YES
Number of observations 2690 2310 2012
Pseudo R2 .152 .154 .161
Log-Likelihood -1405.5 -1151.9 -1003.6
Table 4: Basic Probit regression. CL = Dropped due to collinearity
22reported in regressions V and VI of Table 5 is more dramatic: If we exclude the
85 observations with a capital stock below 35’000 SFR (which corresponds to an
equivalent annuity of 200 SFR per month), the coeﬃcients for the annuity value
and its square get insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcients of the other variables remain
more or less unchanged. It seems that a small capital stock eﬀect dominates all
other aspects. Plausible explanations for this ﬁnding include magnitude eﬀects,
and moral hazard behavior. It is in fact easier to get social assistance if the
retirement beneﬁts are withdrawn as a lump sum capital payment and (immedi-
ately) spent. We have also experimented with other thresholds, but did not ﬁnd
relevant changes in the results.
Regression IV V VI
Coeﬀ. p value Coeﬀ. p value Coeﬀ. p value
Expl. variables (Std) (Std) (Std)
Gender (male=1) .073 0.522 .047 0.687 .044 0.706
(115) (.118) (.117)
Single -.121 0.381 -.155 0.265 -.158 0.256
(.138) (.139) (.139)
Children -.325 0.008 -.329 0.007 -.329 0.007
(.122) (.122) (.122)
Annuity value (log) -2.65 0.000 -.215 0.833 .020 0.753
(.456) (1.02) (.456)
Annuity value2 (log) .134 0.000 .012 0.818
(.024) (.051)
Age at retirement .163 0.000 .171 0.000 .170 0.000
(.044) (.044) (.044)
Conversion factor γ -116.5 0.000 -126.4 0.000 -126.6 0.000
(30.5) (31.1) (31.1)
Deﬁned beneﬁts (=1) CL -.459 0.187 CL
(.348)
Capital threshold
(> 35’000 CHF) NO YES YES
Company dummies YES YES YES
Retirement year dummies YES YES YES
Number of observations 1997 1912 1912
Pseudo R2 .161 .150 .150
Log-Likelihood -995.9 -947.5 -947.5
Table 5: Basic Probit Regressions with and without a capital threshold. CL =
Dropped due to collinearity
234.2 Gender diﬀerences
Some outcomes of the regressions are likely to be due to diﬀerent behavior of men
and women. Married women, for example, may withdraw the capital as a lump
sum because they are already covered by a generous annuity of their husbands.
We therefore split the sample between females and males and do a number of
Probit regressions (see Table 6 and Table 7), on the basis of the speciﬁcations of
Table 4.
For women, marital status still does not play a role, and the age at retirement
is only weakly important for the decision. Compared to the full sample, there are
two striking results. The ﬁrst is that the conversion factor, which is the measure
for the relative value of the two options, is far less signiﬁcant for women than for
men. This is also true for single women, whose behavior can be expected to be
closer to mens’. The second is that there is again a very strong small capital eﬀect
for women. When only larger capital stocks are considered (regression IV,f), the
annuity value gets insigniﬁcant. The explanatory power of the model without
small capital stocks is considerably lower.
For men, the coeﬃcients reported in Table 7 show that single men do not
seem to prefer the lump sum option despite the fact that the implied money
value for the annuity is much smaller than for married men. The coeﬃcient
is always negative, albeit never signiﬁcant. For them the absence of a bequest
motive might oﬀset the lower money value of the annuity. Not surprisingly, the
presence of children dramatically increases the probability to choose the annuity,
and the age at retirement is positively related to the likelihood of the capital
option. In contrast to women, the level of the accumulated capital stock does
not seem to have any impact on the decision. We will see below that this result
may be due to diﬀerences in behavior between companies.
4.3 Company diﬀerences and beneﬁt structure
Table 8 reports the results from the three biggest companies (male beneﬁciaries
only). In general, there are no striking diﬀerences with respect to Table 7 with
one exception: Company 9 displays an inverted U for the capital function, but
the dependency is no more signiﬁcant once the small capital stocks are excluded.
In contrast, company 2 shows a robust and signiﬁcant U even when one excludes
small capital stocks. The conversion factor is signiﬁcant in companies SIG and
ABB, but not in SBB. Interestingly, the two former companies run a deﬁned
contribution scheme, while SBB operates under deﬁned beneﬁts.
To explore the importance of the beneﬁt structure, we split the sample accord-
24Regression I,f II,f III,f VI,f
Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p
Expl. variables (Std) (Std) (Std) (Std)




Divorced .119 0.673 -.064 0.825
(.282) (.291)
Widowed .301 0.357 .382 0.269
(.327) (.345)
Annuity value (log) -4.25 0.000 -4.35 0.000 -4.60 0.000 .126 0.372
(.912) (.918) (.982) (.141)
Annuity value2 (log) .229 0.000 .235 0.000 .250 0.000
(.052) (.053) (.057)
Age at retirement .283 0.059 .279 0.064 .283 0.061 .302 0.058
(.150) (.151) (.151) (.159)
Conversion factor γ -143.9 0.120 -140.8 0.130 -145.4 0.122 -191.4 0.060
(92.5) (92.9) (94.0) (101.7)
Deﬁned beneﬁts (=1) -1.23 0.011 -1.21 0.013 -.703 0.042 -.815 0.027
(.484) (.488) (.346) (.367)
Capital threshold
(> 35’000 CHF) NO NO NO YES
Company dummies YES YES YES YES
Retirement year dummies YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 428 428 379 299
Pseudo R2 .196 .197 .164 .064
Log-Likelihood -213.4 -213.0 -197.2 -155.5
Table 6: Determinants of choosing a lump-sum payment for female beneﬁciaries
(probit estimates). The variable “Children” is excluded, as only two women have
children.
25Regression I,m II,m III,m IV,m
Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p
Expl. variables (Std) (Std) (Std) (Std)




Divorced .136 0.566 .145 0.541
(.237) (.237)
Widowed .138 0.637 .140 0.631
(.292) (.292)
Children -.322 0.009 -.324 0.008
(.123) (.123)
Annuity value (log) -.822 0.277 -.810 0.285 -.936 0.310 -.001 0.986
(.756) (.757) (.921) (.074)
Annuity value2 (log) .039 0.297 .038 0.308 .048 0.304
(.038) (.038) (.046)
Age at retirement .133 0.000 .133 0.000 .161 0.000 .161 0.000
(.036) (.036) (.046) (.046)
Conversion factor γ -95.25 0.000 -96.8 0.000 -121.5 0.000 -122.3 0.000
(23.6) (23.7) (33.3) (33.4)
Deﬁned beneﬁts (=1) -.392 0.140 -.394 0.139 -.459 0.186 -.976 0.000
(.266) (.266) (.347) (.228)
Capital threshold
(> 35’000 CHF) NO NO NO YES
Company dummies YES YES YES YES
Retirement year dummies YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 2242 2242 1615 1610
Pseudo R2 .144 .144 .157 .159
Log-Likelihood -1178.6 -1178.1 -797.7 -793.9
Table 7: Determinants of choosing a lump-sum payment for male beneﬁciaries
(probit estimates).
26ing to whether the company operates under deﬁned beneﬁts (DB=1) or deﬁned
contributions. The corresponding results for two speciﬁcations and male beneﬁ-
ciaries are reported in Table 9. The most striking ﬁnding is that the value of the
annuity (the conversion factor), the age at retirement and the presence of children
only seem to matter for companies operating under deﬁned contributions. This
may again be due to the lower transparency of the diﬀerent options’ values in
deﬁned beneﬁt schemes. The choice in DB companies seems to be driven by other
factors that have not been captured in our estimates. Concerning the impact of
the capital stock, the evidence is mixed (apart from the small capital eﬀect) and
is likely to be dominated by the larger companies in the two sub-samples.
Regression IV(m;SBB) IV(m;SIG) IV(m;ABB) IV(m;ABB)
Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p
Expl. variables (Std) (Std) (Std) (Std)
Single -.053 0.852 -.370 .156 -.381 0.145
(.287) (.261)
Annuity value (log) -7.997 0.011 -4.44 0.242 4.345 0.022 2.843 0.200
(3.14) (3.80) (1.89) (2.22)
Annuity value2 (log) .403 0.008 .206 0.257 -.224 0.018 -.151 0.169
(.151) (.181) (.095) (.110)
Age at retirement .397 0.443 .139 0.063 .100 0.035 .100 0.036
(.518) (.075) (.047) (.047)
Conversion factor γ -222.6 0.541 -115.6 0.005 -207.0 0.000 -203.6 0.000
(364.2) (40.9) (47.27) (47.14)
Capital threshold
(> 35’000 CHF) YES YES NO YES
Ret. year dummies YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 762 377 600 597
Pseudo R2 .085 .068 .042 .041
Log-Likelihood -265.7 -243.6 -396.4.7 -395.2
Table 8: Determinants of choosing a lump-sum payment for male beneﬁciaries
by company (probit estimates), 3 largest companies. SBB runs under deﬁned
beneﬁts, SIG and ABB are deﬁned contribution schemes.
27Regression II,m II,m III,m III,m
Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p
Expl. variables (Std) (Std) (Std) (Std)
Married .200 0.391 .017 0.938 .255 0.280 .137 0.630
(.233) (.223) (.236) (.285)
Divorced .403 0.192 -.498 0.151 .499 0.108 -.451 0.304
(.309) (.346) (.311) (.439)
Widowed .304 0.403 -.041 0.920 .329 0.366 -.220 0.709
(.363) (.406) (.364) (.588)
Children -.438 0.005 -.192 0.317
(.157) (.192)
Annuity value (log) 1.37 0.341 -6.56 0.001 3.26 0.058 -7.65 0.012
(1.44) (1.93) (.157) (3.04)
Annuity value2 (log) -.075 0.289 .329 0.001 -.171 0.046 .384 0.009
(.071) (.095) (.086) (.146)
Age at retirement .119 0.002 .175 0.256 .118 0.014 .444 0.375
(.039) (.154) (.048) (.500)
Conversion factor γ -114.1 0.000 -78.33 0.433 -126.6 0.001 -263.9 0.452
(26.2) (99.9) (36.6) (350.6)
Deﬁned beneﬁts comp. NO YES NO YES
Company and
ret. year dummies YES YES YES YES
Capital threshold
(> 35’000 CHF) YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 1148 1064 771 825
Pseudo R2 .079 .072 .102 .088
Log-Likelihood -727.4 -403.4 -477.4 -285.2
Table 9: Determinants of choosing a lump-sum payment for male beneﬁciaries,
by type of company (probit estimates). Company and retirement year have been
interacted.
284.4 Robustness checks and possible extensions
Table 10 reports the regression results for quantiles of the income variable instead
of the quadratic base speciﬁcation.20 As in the former regressions, there does not
seem to be any role for lifetime income (or, equivalently, accumulated capital)
in the decision to annuitize for men. For women, the only exception is a very
low capital stock, which is usually withdrawn as a lump sum. We have also
experimented with interaction terms (marital status and income, company and
time eﬀects), all of which turned out to be insigniﬁcant.
To draw more solid conclusions it would be desirable to enlarge our data set:
many eﬀects are masked by strong company and year-of-retirement eﬀects. We
hope to be able to do this under the new pension law in Switzerland. As of the
year 2005, pension funds by law have to allow a withdrawal of up to 25% of the
accumulated old-age capital as a lump sum.
4.5 Summary of the results
Overall, the most important result of our analysis is the strong eﬀect of a small
capital stock for the decision (not) to annuitize, especially for women. This
ﬁnding may hint at a moral hazard behavior or a magnitude eﬀect. As the
small capital stock eﬀect is equally strong for married and single individuals, the
presence of a second earner cannot be the main determinant for this behavior
for women. Surprisingly, single men, whose money’s worth of an annuity is well
below average, do not seem to prefer the lump sum more often. This may hint at
the importance of an insurance eﬀect or a bequest motive. Single men presumably
have a less developed family network to provide informal (family) insurance in
old age, as well as a weaker bequest motive than both divorcees and widowers,
who have an equally low MWR. While we do ﬁnd a negative relationship between
old-age capital and the fraction withdrawn as a lump sum, the empirical evidence
for the postulated U in the accumulated capital is mixed, and strongly depends
on the company.
5 Conclusions
We have analyzed the choice between an annuity and a lump–sum capital pay-
ment upon retirement by using data provided by 10 pension funds in Switzerland.
20The base consists of the low capital threshold, 35’000 Sfr., used before. The quantiles 2,
3, 4, 5, and 6 correspond to capital stocks above the threshold, but ≤ 10%, 10-25%, 25-50%,
50-75%, and ≥ 75% respectively.
29Regression II,f II,m III,m
Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p Coeﬀ. p
Expl. variables (Std) (Std) (Std)
Married .094 0.699 .170 0.284 .217 0.221
(.244) (.158) (.178)
Divorced .134 0.618 .076 0.723 .153 0.520
(.270) (.216) (.238)




Age at retirement .055 0.643 .129 0.000 .157 0.001
(.118) (.037) (.047)
Conversion factor γ -2.54 0.972 -96.04 0.000 -118.6 0.000
(72.8) (23.9) (34.0)
Deﬁned beneﬁts (=1) -1.23 0.012 -.313 0.237 -.274 0.457
(.488) (.264) (.368)
Dummy quant. 2 -1.06 0.000 .302 0.572 .480 0.445
(.180) (.534) (1.30)
Dummy quant. 3 -1.04 0.000 .425 0.413 .563 0.357
(.222) (.519) (1.44)
Dummy quant. 4 -1.73 0.000 .294 0.569 .500 0.411
(.368) (.517) (1.48)
Dummy quant. 5 -1.05 0.007 .197 0.702 .519 0.393
(.392) (.517) (1.49)
Dummy quant. 6 -.892 0.055 .244 0.637 .475 0.435
(.466) (.516) (1.51)
Dummy quantiles
joint signiﬁcance YES NO NO
Company and
ret. year dummies YES YES YES
Number of observations 421 2219 1601
Pseudo R2 .149 .144 .159
Log-Likelihood -222.3 -1164.0 -789.4
Table 10: Determinants of choosing a lump-sum payment, by gender with quan-
tiles (probit estimates). CL = Dropped due to collinearity; company and retire-
ment year have been interacted.
30Such a decision involves a very large amount of money. We ﬁnd that the impact
of personal characteristics (such as gender, marital status, age at retirement) on
the individual’s choice, though important, seems to be somewhat overshadowed
by other components, in particular company ﬁxed eﬀects. This indicates a strong
role for peer eﬀects and other choice “anomalies”. The data seems to exhibit an
“acquiescence bias”: the large majority of respondents choose the default option
oﬀered by the company. This is also conﬁrmed by a number of small companies
that had to be excluded due to too little variability in the data. What peers do —
i.e., the implicit standard option — is the main determinant of many individual’s
choice.
The probability of choosing the capital option is shown to be dominated by
a small capital eﬀect: Relatively small capital stocks are much more likely to be
withdrawn as a lump sum. This may be due to a magnitude eﬀect, but equally
probably to a moral hazard behavior of the individuals. Once the capital stock is
depleted (the law even allows some savings), the individual can claim supplemen-
tal beneﬁts. On the other hand, we do not ﬁnd evidence for adverse selection in
our data. This conﬁrms the predictions of Brown (2003) that the utility valida-
tion of annuities implies much smaller diﬀerences between individuals of diﬀerent
life expectancies than the money’s worth of annuities. As a consequence life ex-
pectancy plays a smaller role in the annuitization decision, leading to less adverse
selection.
We believe that a deeper understanding of choice upon retirement and the
related distributional consequences is of great interest to academic economists
and to policy makers. With the growing importance of second pillar pension
plans around the world, the design of pay out options will become increasingly
important. Provided that the fully funded system is the main source of retirement
income, the plans should guarantee a suﬃcient level of income as well as an
adequate insurance against outliving ones assets in old age. The pay out options
should be ﬂexible enough to cater for a wide variety of individual needs in old
age without threatening the insurance of longevity.
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